Insights Unwrapped Regulatory Discipline: The Key to India's Market Stability



1st March 2025



<u>Tight Regulations in India Since September 2024</u></u>

<u>Why Are Regulators Acting as Party Poopers?</u>

<u>A SEBI study revealed that F&O traders lost INR 1.8 lakh crore over the past three fiscal years,</u> with over 93% of retail traders incurring losses. This led to stricter norms, including:-

- Increase in Contract Value: Minimum lot size of derivative contracts to Rs 20 lakh-Rs 30 lakh from the current Rs 5 lakh (which was last set in 2015)
- <u>Restricting weekly options</u> to one expiry per stock exchange per week
- Increased Capital Requirements Higher margins \bullet
- Increased Margin Requirements- Brokers will likely require higher margin deposits from traders to cover the increased risk associated with larger contract sizes. This could further limit the ability of some traders to participate

These measures have drawn comparisons to South Korea (2010-11) and China (2015), where similar regulatory tightening led to a sharp decline in market volumes for several years. Market participants fear that India's derivatives market could face a similar slowdown.



South Korea's Volumes Declined After Tight Regulations



Source : Kotak Institutional Securities

- Once the world's top derivatives trader (until 2011), South Korea dropped out of the top 10 due to stricter regulations. Retail investor participation dropped due to stricter regulations
- <u>Trading volume fell nearly 70%</u>
- Regulations include:
 - <u>Higher collateral</u> <u>requirements</u> for margin trading
 - Increased minimum trading 0 units for index-linked options. (Source: FT)



China's Market Collapsed After Tight Regulations

2021


2023

CHINA'S FUTURES TRADING FRENZY IN 2015

China trading volumes collapsed after regulatory interventions in 2015

China cash trading volumes declined after 2016, to recover only by 2021

-4-



Source : Kotak Institutional Securities

- From 2014 to 2015, China's government encouraged citizens to invest in the stock market in order to strengthen the economy, which effectively doubled the capitalization of the Shanghai Stock Exchange
- Over <u>38 million new accounts</u> were opened in just 2 months before the crash
- In 2015, regulators raised <u>margin</u> requirements from 10% to 40%, triggering a market collapse that erased \$5 trillion in wealth within three months, with trading volumes plummeting



Thankfully, Our Conservative Regulators Prevented a China-

Like Crisis in India

Margin de	bt as percent	of estimated f	ree float		
	-				Ch (SH
9%					-
8%					·····
7%					f-
6%					
5%					
4%					
3%					And I
2%	~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~	US (NYSE)	mm	
1%					
May 1990	May 1995	May 2000	May 2005	May 2010	Ma 201
SOURCES: Wind,	Bloomberg, Macquarie	Research			

<u>Margin Finance in China and the</u> 2010-15 Bull Market


- Margin trading, introduced in 2010, played a key role in China's market reforms
- During the 2014-15 bull run, the Shanghai Composite Index surged 150%, fueled by 2.2 trillion yuan (\$350 billion) in marginfinanced stock purchases
- However, in 2015, China imposed strict restrictions:
 - Margin requirements
 increased from 10% to 40%
 - Position limits were tightened, leading to a stock market crash

nina +SZ) **5%**





<u>Margin Trading Funding (MTF) in India – Not a Concern!</u>



- <u>2025</u>
- 1.8%

(Free float: ~\$2,196B; MTF incl. F&O: ~\$40B)

• India's MTF book peaked at INR 85,000 crore in September 2024 but declined 20% to ₹67,700 crore by February

• Unlike China's 2015 margin debt surge from nearly 0% to <u>8% of free float, India's current ratio remains a modest</u>

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